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The Culture of  Education. Ancient Cynicism and “the scandal of  the 
truth” 
Ansgar Allen 
Without pretending to side with ancient Cynicism - as if  escape from contemporary 
intellectual culture were that easy - I call attention in what follows to the tensions that 
can be drawn between the culture of  education (ranging from education as a systematic 
activity to the values, conduct and self-understanding of  educated people) and the 
radically opposed exploits of  Cynic philosophy . In constructing this summary account 1
of  ancient Cynicism, I draw from the considerable scholarship that emerged in the last 
three decades , but most of  all, frame this analysis by engagement with the work of  two 2
philosophers - Michel Foucault and to a lesser extent Peter Sloterdijk - who were, each in 
their own way, unusually attentive, and receptive to the deviant, devious intent of  ancient 
Cynicism . As both Foucault and Sloterdijk explore, the basic hostility of  Cynic 3
philosophy to the culture of  the educated and the operations of  the intellect, make it 
difficult to interpret. This paper outlines several lines of  divergence between the 
philosophy of  the Cynic and the culture of  the educated (as this tradition is understood 
in the West) at its self-told inception in ancient Greece.  
There is a much more straightforward and less challenging interpretation of  Cynic 
educational philosophy than the one offered here. To outline this alternative, I turn for a 
moment to Donald Dudley’s influential study of  ancient Cynicism, which remains a key 
reference point for much recent scholarship. It offers a rare, though very brief  
consideration of  “Cynic educational theory” . As Dudley explains, an understanding of  4
the educational implications of  Cynic philosophy may be acquired by studying the most 
 Due to the comparative brevity of  the academic paper, I leave much out of  this account. For a more 1
extensive treatment see: A. Allen, Cynicism, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 2019; The Cynical Educator, 
Mayfly, Leicester, UK 2017. The latter book discusses much else besides, attempting a genealogy of  the 
educational good as discussed in "The End of  Education: Nietzsche, Foucault, Genealogy", in «Philosophical 
Inquiry in Education» vol. 25 (2018), n. 1.
 Including: R. B. Branham and M.O. Goulet-Gazé, The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its 2
Legacy, University of  California Press, Berkeley, 1996; D. Mazella, The Making of  Modern Cynicism, University 
of  Virginia Press, Charlottesville 2007; L. Shea, The Cync Enlightenment: Diogenes in the Salon, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 2010.
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth: Lectures at the Collège de France 1983-1984, trans. G. Burchell Palgrave 3
Macmillan, Basingstoke 2011 [1984]; P. Sloterdijk, Critique of  Cynical Reason, trans. M. Eldred University of  
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 2001 [1983]. 
 This phrase is misleading, since Cynicism was a practical rather than theoretical philosophy. D. R. 4
Dudley, A History of  Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century AD, Methuen, London 1937, pp. 87-89. 
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obviously educational activities of  the most famous Cynic, Diogenes, born around 412 
B.C.E.. Dudley focuses on Diogenes’ purported role as a household tutor, which appears 
as a brief  anecdote in Laertius’ Lives of  Eminent Philosophers, a collection that was put 
together a good few centuries later . Though Dudley argues earlier in his book that the 5
story of  Diogenes’ capture by pirates and subsequent purchase by Xeniades of  Corinth 
(whose sons he would apparently teach) is “an invention” , he nonetheless takes this 6
story to encapsulate Cynic educational philosophy. Dudley presents Diogenes as an ideal 
pedagogue in this account, with Diogenes paying close attention in his role as Xeniades’ 
slave/teacher to the moral formation of  his pupils . The educational programme 7
attributed to Diogenes is, as Dudley interprets, a «compound of  various existing systems, 
interpreted in a Cynic spirit». Here, «ordinary Greek elementary education…[ranging 
from athletic training to learning passages by heart] forms its backbone, augmented by 
features derived from Sparta (hunting) and from the Persian system […] (shooting with 
the bow, riding)» . The emphasis in this anecdote is upon the formation of  self-sufficient 8
individuals who will go about (to quote the original source) «silent, and not looking about 
them in the streets» . If  Diogenes’ involvement in producing quiet, orderly pupils does 9
not sound odd enough, we are told that Diogenes’ pupils apparently held him «in great 
regard» . This depiction of  a Cynic education seems decidedly out of  kilter when 10
compared with the more scandalous, confrontational anecdotes of  Diogenes found 
elsewhere in Laertius’s collection. As a compiler of  anecdotes Laertius was content to 
collect contradictory accounts and place them alongside one another, making no attempt 
to arbitrate between them. Given these considerations, it is worth pondering the 
educational implications of  Cynic philosophy more generally, rather than pick out, 
prioritise and interpret occasional and more direct mentions of  education in, for 
example, the anecdotes collected by Laertius. Such an approach - one that reads beyond 
 See D. Laertius, Lives of  Eminent Philosophers Volume 2, (a cura di) J. Henderson, trans. R. D. Hicks, 5
Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1931, 6.30-6.31.
 D.R. Dudley, op. cit., p. 24. 6
 ivi, p. 87.7
 ivi, p. 88.8
 D. Laertius, op. cit., 6.319
 Ibidem.10
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the story of  Diogenes as a household tutor and interprets education itself  in broader 
terms - informs my reading in what follows . 11
Cynicism as sham philosophy 
Though little of  early Cynic writing survives including nothing by Diogenes, some 
ancient sources do report titles of  works that have since been lost to history. These Cynic 
outputs were said to be rather unconventional, either parodying conventional modes of  
writing or subverting convention by adopting non-literary forms such as the diatribe. If  
Diogenes did write - and not all ancient sources confirm this  - his attitude to writing is 12
suggested by the following anecdote: To Hegesias, who asked Diogenes to lend him one 
of  his writings, Diogenes replied; “You are a simpleton Hegesias; you do not choose 
painted figs, but real ones; and yet you pass over the true training and would apply 
yourself  to written rules” . Like many other ancient philosophies, Cynic teachings were 13
passed on chiefly through an oral tradition and taken up as a way of  life.  Unlike most 14
other philosophies, a subsequent Cynic school was never established, one that might have 
codified Cynic principles and established a canon. And where other philosophies were 
only made available to an elect, Cynicism was not exclusive nor was it concerned to 
police its margins. Cynics were known for their outward behaviour, for how they 
expressed themselves in public, rather than for the distinct and clearly stated teachings of  
a philosophy in the more conventional sense. The Cynic had scant regard for the formal 
lectures and exalted language of  established philosophy. Diogenes did his best to 
introduce doubt as to whether he even merited the title “philosopher”, inviting others to 
consider him a fraud.  Cynicism of  this sort is always on the point of  dismissal as “sham 15
philosophy”, measuring its success, perhaps, by the extent it remains marginal from the 
point of  view of  its more respectable cousins.  
 In this reading, I also position myself  against the argument that Cynic philosophy sought to 11
“democratise” education, by basing its activity on an «open admissions policy», as it moved the site of  
philosophical training from the enclaves of  «classical philosophical schools to the street» (K. Kennedy, 
Cynic Rhetoric: The ethics and tactics of  resistance, «Rhetoric Review», vol. 18 (1999), n. 1, p. 29.) Although there 
is undoubtedly truth in this claim, for Cynicism did address a broader audience, in doing so it nonetheless 
submitted both education and philosophy to Cynic derision.  
 R. Bracht Branham and M.O. Goulet-Gazé, Introduction in R. Bracht Branham and M.-O. Goulet-12
Gazé (a cura di), The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, University of  California Press, 
Berkeley 1996, p. 8.
 D. Laertius, op. cit., 6.48.13
 P. Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of  Life, Blackwell, Oxford 1987 [1995]; P. Hadot, What is Ancient 14
Philosophy? Harvard, Cambridge, MA 2004 [1995].
 See D. Mazella, op. cit., pp. 36-42.15
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Cynicism still manages to confound those who would like to rescue it for, or make 
sense of  it in terms of  respectable philosophy. It had no fixed dogmata and seems to have 
operated without a defined “end” or “philosophical goal” otherwise known as its telos. 
This sets it apart from other more obviously teleological philosophies such as Stoicism 
and Epicureanism. Consequently, some have struggled include Cynicism within the 
philosophical canon , whereas others have admitted Cynicism only by articulating an 16
intellectual framework on its behalf, associating it with fundamental commitments to 
freedom, self-mastery, happiness, virtue, cosmopolitanism, and nature . A countervailing 17
view suggests that the most famous tenets of  Cynic philosophy «grew out of  a continual 
process of  ad hoc improvisation» . There were no fundamentals or pre-givens. Cynicism 18
could only take form in practice. That is the position adopted in this paper where, 
according to this reading, key Cynic ideas and methods were only identified 
retrospectively. This process would reify Cynicism, rendering it inert as it marginalized 
the rebellious impulse, the situated and crafty playfulness, the devious improvisation that 
had distinguished it from all other philosophies. Only once these practices had been 
secured, interpreted and codified could they become the hallmark, the inflexible imprint 
of  Cynic tradition. The construction of  a Cynic tradition was, in effect, the death of  
Cynicism.  
Against Plato’s conception of  the philosopher as «a spectator of  time and eternity», 
one might say that Diogenes «was the philosopher of  contingency, of  life in the barrel» . 19
But even this statement offers too much by way of  definition, as if  the telos of  Cynic 
philosophy were a life of  that sort. According to one version of  the story, Diogenes of  
Sinope only ended up living on the street out of  necessity. He was not native to Athens 
but arrived from the borders of  the Greek world as an exile, banished from his home 
city, a wandering migrant who would make himself  increasingly unwelcome in his host 
community. Diogenes is famous for setting up home in a storage jar, but he did so at first 
only because the little house he had hoped for could not be arranged in time . The 20
barrel - in which he would not just live but roll about - gains significance later, as the site 
 Martha Nussbaum, for example, engages in a brief  discussion of  Diogenes, who she quickly decides, 16
offers a “flawed” example of  the Socratic tradition with its focus on the “inner life of  virtue and thought”, 
and who has, for that reason, little to contribute to liberal humanism or philosophy more generally: «It is 
hard to know whether to grant Diogenes the title “philosopher” at all, given his apparent preference for a 
kind of  street theatre over Socratic questioning» (M. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of  
Reform in Liberal Education, Harvard University Press, Harvard 1997, pp. 57-58.).
 For a summary of  these positions see R.B. Branham and M.O. Goulet-Gazé, op. cit., pp. 21-23.17
 R.B. Bracht Branham, Defacing the Currency: Diogenes' Rhetoric and the Invention of  Cynicism, in R.B. Bracht 18
Branham and M.O. Goulet-Gazé (a cura di), The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and Its Legacy, op. cit., 
p. 87.
 ivi, pp. 88-89.19
 D. Laertius, op. cit., 6.22-23.20
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of  his more deviant, devious Cynicism: experimental, unprincipled, and doggedly 
subversive. 
Undercutting convention 
Since Cynic philosophy was improvised, contingent, and did not begin with a dogma 
or declaration of  what it valued most, its development and developing form was a 
function of  its context. Those still searching for definition, for some clear, canonical 
statement concerning the nature and intent of  Cynicism might, then, opt for the 
opposite approach, and define Cynic philosophy by what it opposed. But here, again, 
Cynicism wrong-foots its interpreters; Cynicism was not reactive in any straightforward 
sense. A Cynic does not simply oppose, and define Cynic philosophy in reaction to, what 
is valued or given esteem. Despite appearances, Cynics had nothing against the pursuit of  
virtue, for example. Which is to say, they had no principled philosophical objections to 
virtue as such. Their contempt was heaped on the idea that virtue must be based on 
canonical principles and should be cultivated in a rarefied atmosphere. For this they 
would famously be accused of  attempting a “shortcut to virtue”, for undermining a set 
of  pedagogic assumptions that underpin Western philosophy and its educational and 
religious legacies. As Seneca (first century Roman statesman and tutor to the emperor) 
put it, «virtue only comes to a character which has been thoroughly schooled and trained 
and brought to a pitch of  perfection by unremitting practice» . Virtue is the possession 21
of  the wise, well versed and well off, where the exclusivity of  virtue, Seneca writes, is 
«the best thing about her». There is, he continues, «about wisdom [and the virtue it 
cultivates] a nobility and magnificence in the fact that she […] is not a blessing given to 
all and sundry» . Without defining the Cynic attitude by its negation, this foundational 22
conceit of  the educated person was clearly worth challenging from a Cynic point of  view. 
The Cynic was not straightforwardly anti-culture, either. And here it is worth 
sounding a broader note of  caution to avoid simplifying the object of  Cynic counter-
cultural critique. Insofar as street Cynics later opposed the paideia, or learned culture of  a 
Roman philosopher-emperor such as Julian (operating now as a street philosophy or 
philosophy of  the mob; a movement that extended throughout the Roman Empire), they 
confronted with a cultural phenomenon that was complex and ambiguous in its 
operations. As Peter Brown argues, paideia should not be understood simply as a system 
of  exclusion by which the Roman nobility and political elite asserted their “exalted” 
status as bearers of  culture and refinement. If  that were the case, the task for Cynics 
would be relatively straightforward, where all Cynic philosophy would need to do is 
reveal paideia as an artifice, a set of  arbitrary cultural values by which the nobility exalts 
itself  on false pretence. Cynics could then attack paideia as an agent of  cultural 
 Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, trans. R. Campbell, Penguin, London 2004, pp. 176-7. 21
 Ivi, p. 162.22
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oppression. But as a marker of  nobility and system of  decorum, paideia did not just exalt 
the powerful. In Brown’s analysis, «it controlled them by ritualizing their responses and 
by bridling their raw nature through measured gestures» . Its rituals helped organize the 23
violence of  imperial power, submitting it to convention, rendering it predictable. Its 
protocols operated against «a tide of  horror that lapped close to the feet of  educated 
persons» . Consequently, or so one might conclude, the Cynic task cannot be to destroy 24
the pretensions of  culture and leave it there, since that would open the way to unbridled 
power. Cynicism, from this point of  view, is not just anti-culture; it attempts a more 
exacting critique of  the systems of  power that culture is imbricated with and supportive 
of. 
The hostility to intellectual culture found in Cynic philosophy should also not be 
essentialised, as if  Cynics were just a bunch of  anti-intellectuals with an axe to grind. 
Cynics were not hostile to attempts to understand the world in which they lived and died. 
They were merely suspicious of  the common prejudice that the world is best understood 
by adopting the conventions of  rationality endorsed by a particular philosophical school 
(or in contemporary terms, the idea that the intellect must adhere to a particular 
discipline, method, or mode of  writing and speech). As a philosopher of  contingency, 
the Cynic is said to live without certainties and does not mourn their absence. The 
Cynic’s life could be described as an experiment, determined to perturb and explore the 
boundaries of  ordinary existence. For Diogenes, this experiment often takes the form of  
a hostile engagement, one that issues from the street if  not the loins, where the 
philosopher sends out provocations, examines the retorts provoked by them, and comes 
to understand the limits these retorts reflect. The challenge is to improvise a way of  life 
that can sustain itself  alongside and outside these limits. By rejecting the consolations 
and comfortable illusions of  intellectual culture, by risking social marginalisation, 
alienation and political retribution, by actively seeking destitution and physical hardship, 
the Cynic discovered the world through a series of  practical confrontations with it. 
Fearless speech 
Fearless speech, otherwise known as parrhesia, has become a recurring theme in 
accounts of  Cynic philosophy—it is prominent in Foucault’s interpretation . As a Cynic 25
theme it draws attention to the specific bravery of  the Cynic philosopher who speaks 
freely, though the term applies to others too, most famously Socrates who conducted 
free speech as dialogue. The term recurs throughout Greek and Roman literature, 
describing a mode of  interaction that free men might engage in (where, due to their 
 P. Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire, University of  Wisconsin 23
Press, Madison, WI 1992, p. 56.
 ivi, p. 52.24
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth; Fearless Speech, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles 2001.25
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oppressed status, women, slaves, aliens and children were debarred from taking part in 
parrhesiastic exchanges). Though parrhesia clearly took different forms in antiquity, 
Cynicism stretched its basic definition in terms of  who might partake in parrhesia, whilst 
pushing this mode of  speech towards its limit point, a point at which free speech ceases 
to be tolerated, and dialogue is replaced by violent reprisal. Since freedom to practice 
parrhesia was generally associated with «the rights of  a citizen (in a democratic state) or 
the privileges of  an aristocrat», it is argued that Diogenes’ claim to parrhesia, issuing as it 
did from «the bottom of  the social hierarchy - as an impoverished noncitizen’- was a 
bold manoeuvre». Parrhesia was remodelled by removing it from an elite originating 
context governed by conventions of  decorum, and by putting it to use within a setting 
that refused these restraints and should not have been practicing parrhesia in the first 
place .  26
Cynicism distorted the basic rules of  parrhesia in other respects too. Parrhesia 
depended on an agreement between interlocutors to bear the other’s free speech without 
reprisal. Cynic philosophy stretched this agreement to breaking point. In basing its use of  
parrhesia so heavily on the form of  an insult (rather than the form of  an uncomfortable 
truth that the parrhesiast is trying, valiantly to put across), the Cynic parrhesiast plays «at 
the very limits of  the parrhesiastic contract», as Foucault puts it . Unlike Socrates - who 27
in many respects represents the Western educator in its ideal form  - a Cynic such as 28
Diogenes of  Sinope would not be so courteous as to engage in respectful dialogue where 
mutual interaction depends at least on a pretence of  mutual regard. Diogenes’ speech 
poured forth heedless of  whether or not one consented to its onslaught. Whilst Socrates 
risked the irritation if  not anger of  his companions by persuading them through 
dialogue, trickery and irony of  their ignorance, of  not knowing what they claimed to 
know, the Cynic risks the vengeance of  his auditors more openly, berating them to reject 
and despise everything they accept to be true and proper. Whereas the Socratic teacher 
«plays with his interlocutors ignorance» in order to generate a thirst for wisdom, so as to 
cause them to apply themselves more earnestly and thoroughly to their education; 
Diogenes seeks to hurt their pride . Dialogue is replaced by diatribe and insult, or it is 29
suspended altogether, whereupon the Cynic exhibits him or herself  shamelessly before a 
public, causing deliberate offence.  
The Cynic speaks fearlessly only after becoming, or so as to become free of  
attachments. The Cynic must attempt to become free of  duties that function as 
constraints. Foremost amongst these constraints are the operations of  the conscience, 
which, as Foucault argues, is a tool of  self-government that was perfected during the 
long interval of  Christendom and bequeathed on modernity to become the key means by 
 R.B. Bracht Branham, Diogenes’'Rhetoric and the Invention of  Cynicism, art. cit., p. 97.26
 M. Foucault, Fearless Speech, op. cit., p. 127.27
 A. Allen, The Cynical Educator, op. cit., pp. 19-21.28
 M. Foucault, Fearless Speech, op. cit., p. 126.29
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which its modern and late-modern inheritors are constrained . Again, a word of  caution 30
is necessary. To suggest that the Cynic seeks to become free of  these chattels might give 
the impression that the perfect Cynic would be a kind of  sociopath; bold, disinhibited, 
free of  remorse, this character would be at liberty to pursue his or her philosophy of  
deviance without hindrance. Cynic philosophy was, however, far more intricated in, and 
appreciative of  the social norms it sets out to question than this depiction of  the Cynic 
as a kind of  sociopath would allow. The Cynic is committed to their complex, internal 
unravelling. Cynic philosophy was not modelled on the idea of  straightforward escape as 
if  it were a matter of  breaking loose, stepping outside, or turning one’s back on 
convention. Escapees always carry more baggage than they realise. 
Impoverishment and dependence 
The problem of  escape is further deepened by the practice of  Cynic impoverishment. 
This activity demonstrated that the pursuit of  freedom, of  a life free of  attachments, can 
have paradoxical effects. The Cynic begins by stripping down existence, getting rid of  
anything that might be considered superfluous, casting off  material goods that would tie 
the Cynic down through his or her dependence on them. In a notorious anecdote, 
Diogenes even threw away his wooden cup, which was said to be one of  his last 
belongings. Having observed a boy drink from his hollowed hand, Diogenes found his 
cup to be yet another unnecessary burden . As Foucault interprets, the Cynic of  this 31
more radical persuasion was «always looking for possible further destitution». Cynic 
poverty was a «dissatisfied poverty which strives to get back to the ground of  the 
absolutely indispensable». It was «an indefinite poverty endlessly at work on itself» . This 32
deliberate and progressive impoverishment committed the Cynic to a life of  dirt and 
dishevelment, affording an independence of  sorts - liberation from the trappings of  
wealth and civilized society - though, and here’s the rub, the very pursuit of  
impoverishment also tied the Cynic to his (or her) materially advantaged superiors. It 
imposed a vicious dependence of  its own, since the Cynic becomes increasingly reliant 
on the alms of  others. The stigma entailed in such a relation of  charitable dependence 
should not be underestimated in a Greek and Roman context where personal honour 
ranked so highly as a virtue amongst “free” men. To court dishonour in such a way 
would be a radical test of  the Cynic’s resolve to live a different life. It would ensure the 
Cynic pursuit of  poverty was more than a romantic affectation. The true Cynic, the 
Cynic in pursuit of  a philosophy of  deviance, deliberately seeks the shame of  penury and 
hopes to survive it. Presumably those who overcome the worst humiliation will achieve 
 See especially M. Foucault The Will to Knowledge, trans. Robert Hurley, Penguin, London 1998 [1976].30
 Diogenes, Diogenes the Cynic: Sayings and Anecdotes, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012, pp. 10-11.31
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, cit., p. 258.32
materiali foucaultiani, a. VII, n. 13-14, gen-dic 2018, pp. 75-92  82
Allen The Culture of  Education
the most thorough purging of  all false codes of  conduct and notions of  decency. The 
route to independence, rather oddly then, is through the Cynic’s insufferable dependence 
on the charity of  others. To enhance the effect, the Cynic must learn to be resolutely 
ungrateful when given alms and be indifferent to those who cast judgement. One portrait 
depicts Demetrius, a first century Cynic from Corinth, refusing money from the Roman 
Emperor. «If  he wanted to tempt me, he should have offered me the whole Empire», the 
Cynic responds .  33
The Cynic body 
Cynicism deliberately upset the conventions of  philosophy and the pedagogical 
relationships it depended upon. To this might be added the further suggestion, itself  a 
little scandalous, that Cynics brought the underpinning aggression of  Western education 
to the surface by basing its own educational relationships on the form of  an insult. As it 
did so it placed the body firmly at the centre of  its teaching practice. As an educational 
activity, and by contrast to the stiff  austerity of  Platonism, Cynic philosophy is rooted in 
the experience of  the body which it embraces as essentially ungovernable. The body 
betrays us precisely when we wish it would submit. Contrast this with Plato’s dialogue, 
the Phaedo, in which the body is conceptualised as a distracting source of  «loves and 
desires and fears and all sorts of  fancies and a great deal of  nonsense, with the result that 
we literally never get an opportunity to think at all about anything». So long as we remain 
adversely affected by it, Plato continues, «there is no chance of  our ever attaining 
satisfactorily to our object, which we assert to be Truth» . For the Cynic, the body 34
operates very differently, in relation to a radically altered understanding of  truth and how 
it is to be produced. Cynic truth appears as a product of  scandal, as a “scandal of  the 
truth”, an event that is mediated by the body and its emissions . This scandal helps 35
question educational regimes that submit to restrictive conceptions of  Truth or wisdom 
based on a promise of  realization and fulfilment that is forever withheld. It notes how 
this educational promise is itself  attached to a demand, a call to domesticate the body in 
anticipation, and by way of  preparation for a promise that is never delivered. By explicit 
contrast, where the unrestrained, immediate, and laughable presence of  Cynic truth 
 Ivi, p. 194.33
 Plato, Phaedo, in The Last Days of  Socrates, trans. H. Tredennick & H. Tarrant, Penguin, London 1993, 34
p. 66b-c. It is worth noting that this dualism between the soul of  the philosopher (which is inclined to 
reason) and his body (which operates as a source of  material distraction), gave way, as Lloyd argues, to a 
«more complex location of  the rational» in Plato’s later work, where non-rational forces are placed «not 
outside a soul which is of  itself  entirely rational, but within the soul as a source of  inner conflict» (G. 
Lloyd, The Man of  Reason: ‘Male ‘ & ‘Femaile’ in Western Philosophy, Routledge, London 1993, p. 7. However, 
the contrast with the Cynic placement of  the body nonetheless stands.
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, cit. p. 174ff.35
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appears, «the very body of  the truth is made visible» . Cynic truth appears in a style of  36
life that undermines the abstract seriousness of  conventional Truth, with its claims to 
improvement, and its persistent deferrals.   
Cynic truth is indexed to the Cynic body which bears witness to reality, bringing to 
question the value of  so-called higher things and the demands they make upon us. Where 
Plato sought to «define the soul’s being in its radical separation» from the life of  the 
body, the Cynic operated in the opposite direction, seeking to reduce «life to itself, to 
what it is in truth». As Foucault interprets, this basic truth was revealed through the very 
act of  living as a Cynic, where the Cynic was not simply casting aside his or her last 
possessions (with the exception of  the famous cloak and staff). Rather, all pointless 
conventions and all superfluous opinions’ were to be given up, in a «general stripping of  
existence» . 37
In each case, as Foucault argues, the “true life” takes a different meaning. For Plato it 
is associated with the life that is simple, the life that does not conceal its intentions, is 
straight, undeviating and oriented to a higher order. This philosophical life is set against 
the life of  those still «prey to the multiplicity of  [their] desires, appetites, and impulses» . 38
The true life is evaluated by its adherence to rules of  good conduct (that Plato and his 
inheritors outline), but more than this, by its overall (apparent) unity. It is the life that 
remains unchanged in the face of  adversity . This higher existence is achieved by those 39
few who have the strength and discipline to maintain a secure and stable identity amid 
corruption and upheaval. It is the life of  an incipient educated elite, of  those who justify 
their elevation above the uneducated, uncultivated masses in near cosmic terms. As such, 
it becomes the object of  desire of  philosopher emperors and statesmen such as Marcus 
Aurelius, Seneca and Julian. With adjustment it will form the underpinning assumption 
of  a nineteenth century liberal education and its masculine ideal, the liberal “gentleman”, 
which, shorn of  its more obvious elitism, still influences us to this day in the guise of  the 
educated person who espouses virtues of  moderation and constancy from positions of  
relative comfort.  
This was a considerable edifice to oppose, and remains so, even in its watered-down, 
contemporary secular manifestation; namely, the poise and character of  the educated 
person who values people of  “substance”, taste and cultivated intellect above those 
without. For the Cynic, the “true life” operates completely differently. It is the dog’s life. 
Diogenes was known as the “dog” and responded in kind, according to a popular 
anecdote: «At a dinner some people were tossing bones to him as though he were a dog». 
So Diogenes «rid himself  of  them by pissing on them» . Diogenes remained true to his 40
 Ivi, p. 173.36
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, op. cit., p. 171.37
 Ivi, p. 222.38
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materiali foucaultiani, a. VII, n. 13-14, gen-dic 2018, pp. 75-92  84
Allen The Culture of  Education
philosophy in this sense, doing in public what others would conceal, acting without 
modesty or shame. He extended, if  not radicalised Plato’s injunction to be unflagging in 
ones’ commitment to truth and remain unchanged in the face of  adversity. By acting the 
part of  the dog Diogenes inverted the humiliation intended for him. He embraced his 
caricature; injuring the dignity of  those he pissed on.  
A public scandal 
From the perspective of  civilized society, dogs should be toilet trained. They must be 
subjected to the will of  their master as they learn to master themselves, taking control of  
their own emissions. For the Greek philosopher, mastery always begins at home. Here 
the “true life” is interpreted as a sovereign life in which the philosopher achieves, or at least 
works towards self-mastery. This life is “sovereign” insofar as it attempts a high degree 
of  self-control, submitting the faculties of  mind and body to the will of  the intellect. No 
part of  the philosopher’s self  thus imagined should escape the discipline and composure 
of  a well-governed mind.  
This kind of  self-possession is not only the high ideal to which Plato’s philosopher 
king aspires. It is also the Roman Stoic dream of  a figure such as Seneca. According to 
this distinctly masculine conception of  philosophy, it is believed that the sovereign life 
will be beneficial to others . Indeed, the generosity of  the sovereign life is constructed 41
as if  it were an obligatory, necessary component of  that existence. The philosopher 
provides students and friends alike with assistance and direction, extending the same care 
of  self  (a form of  diligent self-denial) that resulted in the philosopher’s self-mastery, to 
the care of  the student or friend. There will be wider benefits too, since the philosopher’s 
life offers a lesson that is of  greater, if  not universal significance. The splendour and 
brilliance of  the sovereign life, the life of  complete self-mastery, «adorns humankind»  42
from this point of  view, and educates it too, having an influence so profoundly far 
reaching it continues long after the philosopher’s exemplary life has ended.  
Such ideas have maintained their dominance; they recur, for instance, in the 
nineteenth-century revival of  liberal education, and at a lower level, in the development 
of  popular schooling that was based in part on the notion that teachers would act like 
secular priests, serving as moral exemplars to be emulated by the offspring of  the poor . 43
Such ideas may also be found in the argument for a modern humanities curriculum, 
 For a critique of  the patriarchal constitution of  Western philosophy see A. Cavarero, In Spite of  Plato: 41
A Feminist Rewriting of  Ancient Philosophy, Polity, Cambridge UK 1995. See also Lloyd, The Man of  Reason. op. 
cit.
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, cit., p. 272.42
 See B. Knights, The Idea of  the Clerisy in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 43
UK 1978; I. Hunter, Rethinking the school: Subjectivity, bureaucracy, criticism, St Martin's Press, New York 1994; I. 
Hunter, Culture and Government: The Emergence of  Literary Education, Macmillan, London 1988.
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which claims that people of  culture and refinement are necessary to bear society through 
periods of  fragmentation, where no era has faced so much difficulty as the modern 
period.  It remains the case that «the security of  the humanities within institutions of  44
higher education in particular rests on the continuing assumption that they are 
intrinsically supportive of  “civilization” - that is, of  the Establishment» . It is not 45
necessary to be a Cynic to point out the longstanding discrepancy between this ideal and 
the reality of  educational practice. But the Cynic takes the argument further, gesturing to 
a rival mode of  existence that runs counter to the beneficent humanism of  a liberal 
education.  
Like the true life, the idea of  a sovereign existence is hijacked and undermined in a 
characteristic gesture of  Cynic détournement. The very idea of  sovereignty is inverted and 
dirtied. The Cynic also claims to be living a sovereign existence, to be a “king” amongst 
men, but adopts the mantle of  a sovereign existence only to bring it down to earth. This 
philosopher has achieved “sovereign” self-composure rather differently. The Cynic 
chooses to pursue destitution, «pushing back the limits of  what he [or she] can bear»  in 46
order to develop a completely different way of  relating to the world. This “sovereign” 
life still entails a duty to others, what a liberal-minded thinker might call, a duty of  care. 
The Cynic life involves a dedication to others that operates without gratitude or 
recognition. The Cynic does not offer a beautiful example for others to emulate. The 
Cynic life does not adorn humankind. The Cynic existence is committed to a personal 
 See B. Knights, op. cit. For comparatively recent attempts at reviving, “updating” and giving new 44
impetus to these ideas see A. Delbanco, College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton 2011; M. Edmundson, Why Teach? In Defense of  a Real Education, Bloomsbury, New York 2013; W. 
Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of  the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life, The Free 
Press, New York 2014. Interestingly, in her defence of  liberal education, Martha Nussbaum engages in a 
brief  discussion and dismissal of  Diogenes (see note above). Diogenes only gets a mention due to the 
irritating fact (from the perspective of  this tradition) that he is widely credited for inventing the concept of  
the cosmopolitan or «citizen of  the world [or cosmos]» that (via the Stoics) later liberal thinkers have come 
to celebrate as a cultural ideal (Nussbaum, op. cit., p. 56.). Diogenes apparently coined the word when he 
declared that he was a cosmopolitan (Laertius, op. cit., 6.63.), a statement that is paralleled by the absurd 
(because unrealisable) notion that the “only true commonwealth” is that «which is as wide as the 
universe» (ivi, 6.72.). It has been argued that since the cosmos has no citizens, Diogenes’ neologism could 
be understood as a «witty rejection of  actual citizenship [including world citizenship]… and an affirmation 
of  the larger, apolitical allegiances of  a Cynic», which refuse to be bounded by such arbitrary constraints 
(Bracht Branham, op. cit., p. 96.). The idea that one might be a citizen of  the cosmos is patently absurd. 
Diogenes’ neologism might be understood as a joke made at the expense of  those who take citizenship 
seriously, those who extend their humanism to the most distant speck of  dark matter hurtling through 
space. This includes all those who failed to understand the original jest and subsequently claim, in all 
seriousness, to uphold some cosmopolitan ideal, to be a citizen of  the world. 
 A. Grafton and L. Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth 45
and Sixteenth-Century Europe, Duckworth, London 1986, p. xvi.
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, op. cit., p. 278.46
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and public disfigurement of  what is valued most in this idea, this notion of  our common 
humanity. The Cynic still adopts the role of  public benefactor, but Cynic generosity is 
self-consciously and deliberately harsh. In words attributed to Diogenes: «Other dogs 
bite their enemies, but I my friends, so as to save them» .  47
Aggressive teaching 
With this conception of  the Cynic in mind, Foucault describes the Cynic as an 
«aggressive benefactor, whose main instrument is, of  course, the famous diatribe». The 
Cynic «speaks out and attacks» . There is something deliberately, openly agonistic about 48
Cynic philosophy, as Foucault points out. Nonetheless, portraying Cynic philosophy in 
this way - as a philosophy that benefits others by inflicting violence upon them - risks 
presenting Cynics as straightforward aggressors, though Diogenes would also charm 
others, flatter them even. This ability to switch between aggression and charm provides 
another example of  Cynic flexibility. It offers further evidence of  the militant suppleness 
of  a way of  life designed to negotiate and unpick social relations, confusing or wrong-
footing the Cynic’s interlocutor, encouraging pride and good feeling if  only to «prepare 
the way for [and enhance the effect of] additional aggressive exchanges»  As Dio 49
Chrysostom, a first century notable and rhetorician explains, Diogenes would use 
honeyed words, «just as nurses, after giving the children a whipping, tell them a story to 
comfort and please them» . Undue focus on Cynic aggression also risks downplaying or 50
distracting from the more easily disguised (because apparently benign) violence of  other 
breeds of  benefaction . It implies by contrast that the generosity of  other schools of  51
ancient philosophy, where philosophers were conceived as physicians of  the soul, was a 
generosity without aggression. And yet, the philosopher who gives kindly advice, who 
perhaps “adorns” humankind with the beautiful example of  his presence, is also 
aggressive, I would argue, in promoting his version of  the good. The Cynic is only 
unique for openly declaring his (or sometimes her) aggressive intent.  
In its educational engagements, Cynicism embraces quite explicitly «the form of  a 
battle»  or war, «with peaks of  great aggressivity and moments of  peaceful calm» . For 52 53
 Diogenes, op.cit., p. 24.47
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, cit., p. 279.48
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Platonists and Stoics, the battle is largely covered over with refinement, but it is a battle 
nonetheless. It takes form as a fight against the passions, vices, desires and false appetites, 
as a philosopher seeks «the victory of  reason over his own appetites or his soul over his 
body» . Some version of  the philosopher’s fight, along with its recommended 54
destination, is then prescribed for others. Cloaked in refinement, this fight would come 
to dominate education as the necessary, justifiable battle that education performs every 
day for the hearts, minds, and futures of  those it raises.  
The Cynics also battled with passions and appetites, and in that respect were not so 
very distant from their philosopher-contemporaries, only this battle was extended to 
«customs, conventions, institutions, laws, and a whole condition of  humanity». It was a 
battle against vices, but these were not approached as individual flaws, but «vices which 
afflict humankind as a whole, the vices of  men», as Foucault puts it; vices «which take 
shape, rely upon, or are at the root of  their customs, ways of  doing things, laws, political 
organizations, or social conventions […] The Cynic battle is an explicit, intentional, and 
constant aggression directed at humanity in general, at humanity in its real life» - with 
humanity understood here as a fabrication, as something that can be reworked . Like 55
every other philosophy of  its time, Cynicism seeks to transform moral attitudes, passions 
and appetites, but it does so by attacking the structures and conventions that these 
attitudes are symptomatic of. The Cynic sought to release humanity from its current 
attachments, where Cynic interventions grow in strength and reach to the extent they 
manage to cause outrage, bringing unthinking commitments to the surface, rendering 
them visible and open to adjustment. 
Indecency, shame and humiliation 
Diogenes was not lacking in the arts of  sophistication. He had mastered that ancient 
display of  urbanity known as the oration, though only to subvert it. It is claimed that 
after one particularly well-received public oration, at which «many stood about and 
listened to his words with great pleasure», Diogenes ceased «speaking, and squatting on 
the ground, performed an indecent act» . Unsurprisingly, this caused great insult. One 56
interpretation of  what Diogenes was up to here is that he was authenticating his 
Cynicism by squatting before an audience. Surely, having debased himself  in this way 
Diogenes had nothing more to gain from abiding by the falseness of  public theatre and 
conventional rhetoric: «Because he has nothing to lose, he can tell the truth and, 
 M. Foucault, The Courage of  Truth, cit., p. 280.54
 Ibidem.55
 D. Chrysostom, Discourses 1-11, (a cura di) J. Henderson, trans. J. W. Cohoon, Loeb Classical Library, 56
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 1932, Oration 8 §36.
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therefore, may be worth listening to» . This moment - something his audience failed to 57
understand - was the point after which they should begin listening, rather than turn away. 
Having disgraced himself  so completely, Diogenes had no reason to flatter or dupe 
them. His authority as Cynic philosopher relied upon the assurance this act gave his 
audience that Diogenes was not bound by any convention including those rules that 
govern social intercourse. Or so the argument goes. 
The significance of  this scatological episode is testified by the extent to which it has 
become one of  the signature acts of  Diogenes’ philosophy. But there is a danger in 
giving it priority. There is a risk of  reducing Cynicism to this single act, as if  the key 
manoeuvre in any Cynic engagement is to first authenticate one’s Cynicism by fidelity, by 
an act of  shameless courage that places the Cynic centre-ground and beyond doubt. 
Working against this reductive tendency, there is another approach to understanding 
Cynicism, one that views it as a more tactical engagement, once more involving the kind 
of  situated flexibility and inventiveness one might expect of  a militant, non-dogmatic 
philosopher. This engagement begins with the context it seeks to subvert, and defines 
itself  in combat against that context, paying far less attention to matters of  fealty to 
Cynic tradition (which risk essentializing Cynicism and turning its gaze inwards). A 
slightly different interpretation, then, one that does not simply understand squatting 
before an audience as a gesture of  self-authentication, is to point out that Diogenes not 
only excreted in public, he did so precisely when his audience was most enraptured. The 
deliberate timing of  the act is key. Diogenes was not claiming to exist entirely outside the 
norms that governed social life since he had already shown how well he could abide by 
them (up until that point his audience had been enraptured). He was not ignorant of  
finer things, perhaps overcome by base impulses and unable to act otherwise. The 
problem that Diogenes presents is the fact he chooses to act in such a way, and does so 
from a position of  sophistication, namely, from a position that had, up until that point, abided 
by shared norms of  public conduct. One way of  interpreting this scatological act then, is 
to understand it as an attack upon cultured refinement, a blast from below, by someone 
who is all-too-familiar with what he attacks.  
Another way of  approaching the problem of  Diogenes’ base behaviour (which 
included public masturbation) is to observe that if  he had wished above all else to pursue 
the animal life, there is no reason why he should have chosen to do so in Athens. If  his 
was a simple regression to the animalistic, it might have been pursued anywhere. What 
remains significant about Diogenes’ example is that he remained in Athens, and not in 
any back alley, but prominently displayed in the agora. Diogenes situates himself  in 
society as an agent of  cultural transformation. Confronting the problem with 
characteristic candour, Sloterdijk argues: «Diogenes taught masturbation by practical 
example, as cultural progress, mind you, not as regression to the animalistic» . Here 58
Sloterdijk comes close to claiming that the shameless behaviour of  the Cynic seeks to 
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demonstrate «that people as a rule are ashamed for the wrong reasons [for their bodily 
emissions, for example]…while they remain unmoved by their irrational and ugly 
practices, their greed, unfairness, cruelty, vanity, prejudice, and blindness» . But 59
Sloterdijk goes much further, arguing that for the Cynic, the very finest customs we live 
by, «including those dealing with shame», are “perverted”. For this reason, the Cynic 
refuses to be «led by the nose by deeply engrained commandments regarding shame». 
Building on such deep-set suspicion, shameless behaviour sets out to test all social 
conformisms that uphold the operations of  empire. Against the conceit of  such 
unthinking conformism «Diogenes turns the tables. He literally shits on the perverted 
norms», to quote Sloterdijk again. Diogenes set «himself  in opposition to the political 
training in virtue of  all systems», where these systems depend on shame to secure their 
purchase .  60
As Foucault argues along somewhat similar lines, if  the soul is to be educated, it must 
be convinced that somewhere, somehow its activities and inclinations are visible. Ancient 
philosophy inaugurated a cultural trajectory that would make the self, the individual, 
individuated subject appears transparent to its own introverted interrogations, sometimes 
adding an external agent (an idea that was clearly taken up by Christianity), where for a 
Stoic philosopher such as Epictetus, God dwells within us. Consequently, all impure 
thoughts and dirty actions sully that divine presence as much as they do the Stoic 
practitioner . One must live in private as if  nothing remains concealed, developing the 61
necessary inhibitions and restraints. To challenge this framework of  subjugation, the 
Cynic opts to radicalise the idea that nothing is concealed, by acting it out. The Cynic 
responds to the injunction that the true life is the life that has nothing to hide, by hiding 
nothing. The Cynic does everything in the open, having given up the security of  a home 
or retreat to privacy. This removes or at least places in question the constraining 
influence of  a conscience that is designed precisely for those private spaces that must be 
convinced of  their culpability. Since these private spaces have become the residence of  
the conscience, this staging of  life [by the Cynic] in its material and everyday reality under 
the real gaze of  others, of  everyone else, or at any rate of  the greatest possible number 
of  others» , can be understood as an attempt to render the moral order imposed by the 62
conscience inoperable, or at least open to question.  
Cynicism places shame and humiliation at the centre of  its educational practice. As it 
does so it brings to expression the tendency of  all educational relations to shame and 
humiliate those who are to be educated. Here, as with aggression, the ancient Cynics 
acted out and thereby drew attention to the inherent humiliations of  educational 
experience, finding radical potential in naming what some might prefer to deny. Diogenes 
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actively ridiculed those who would have him be their teacher, and thereby acted on and 
transformed the tendency of  educational relations to shame and humiliate. According to 
one account, when someone expressed a wish to study philosophy with Diogenes, he 
«gave him a fish to carry and told him to follow in his footsteps». Ashamed, and perhaps 
a little perplexed, the man threw it away: «When Diogenes came across him some time 
later, Diogenes burst out laughing and said, “Our friendship was brought to an end by a 
fish”»!  It seems what the would-be disciple failed to understand is that to practice 63
Cynicism one undergoes repeated humiliation, where to carry the fish would be to act as 
if  one were Diogenes’ slave – an unbearable humiliation in Athenian society. As 
Sloterdijk argues, the Cynic has a taste for humiliation, understanding that shame is «the 
most intimate social fetter, which binds us, before all concrete rules of  conscience, to 
universal standards of  behaviour» . As «a main factor in social conformism», shame 64
operates as «the switch point where external controls are transformed into internal 
controls».  For that reason, shame and humiliation are at the centre of  a Cynic revolt.  65
Coda 
Diogenes accumulated disciples by accident and only retained them so long as they 
would not be shaken off. This foregrounded a very different understanding of  the 
relationship between (a normally revered) philosopher-teacher and (a closely associated 
disciple). It testified to the presence of  humiliation, rejection and aggression at the centre 
of  the teaching relation. This reflected the treatment that Diogenes apparently received 
at the hands of  Antisthenes, pupil of  Socrates and proto-Cynic, who beat Diogenes with 
his staff  for coming too close.  There were variations on the theme, where Crates—66
Diogenes pupil—famously converted Metrocles to Cynicism with a well-timed and 
kindly fart.  Hostile to conventional understandings of  education, dismissive of  67
hangers-on, Cynic teaching was not modelled on the life of  study, but on the life of  
provocations and bowel movements. If  it had a philosophy of  education, this philosophy 
was improvised and scatological, designed to transgress our basic assumptions of  what 
education should look and feel like. Cynicism, it seems, still has much to teach us. 
Ansgar Allen 
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The Culture of  Education. Ancient Cynicism and “the scandal of  the truth” 
This paper extends Michel Foucault’s analysis of  ancient Cynicism to the critique of  
education. Foucault understands the Cynic scandal as an attempt to transgress the 
world of  convention in favour of  another life, a life that the Cynic begins to improvise. 
Since education helps orient our existence, it too must be scandalized from a Cynic 
point of  view. This paper explores how Cynicism challenges a set of  ideas and 
attachments central to education. Most notably: the role of  the teacher as guide; the 
function of  education in encouraging self-mastery and the pursuit of  the ‘true’ life; the 
relation between education and the development of  the conscience; the object, aims 
and methods of  educational critique; and finally, most strikingly, the presence and 
refinement of  aggression in educational relationships.  
Keywords: Cynisism, parrhesia, cynic scandal, cynic experimentation, neoliberal education 
Questo articolo estende l’analisi di Michel Foucault del Cinismo antico alla critica 
dell’educazione. Foucault interpreta lo scandalo Cinico come un tentativo per trasgredire 
il mondo delle convenzioni in cerca di un’altra vita, una vita che il Cinico persegue 
improvvisando. Poiché l’educazione orienta la nostra esistenza, essa stessa deve divenire 
oggetto di scandalo da una prospettiva cinica. Questo contributo mette in discussione un 
insieme di idee e presupposti centrali per l’educazione. Di cui i più notevoli riguardano: il 
ruolo del l’insegnante come educatore; la relazione tra educazione e la formazione della 
coscienza; l’oggetto, i fini e i metodi educatovi; e non da ultimo, straordinariamente, la 
presenza e la delicatezza dell’aggressione nella relazione educativa. 
Parole chiave: cinismo, parrhesia, scandalo cinico, sperimentazione cinica, educazione 
neoliberale 
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